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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
resume his duties; it is not necessary for him to have
reached the zone of his employment or the territory
in which he was employed to work."
This view permits injustice to be worked on the principal
in many cases, and is for that reason undesirable.
The intermediate and majority view allows the Court
to sit more or less as a jury, balancing the equities of each
individual case, and then ruling as a matter of law. This,
it might be urged, makes the rule more difficult to apply,
but nevertheless, is the only one whereby substantial
justice may be accomplished in the great majority of the
cases.
RES JUDICATA IN LICENSE DETERMINATIONS
BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
Knox v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City'
In February, 1939, appellant filed an application with
the Board of Zoning Appeals to construct a tool house on
a lot in Baltimore City, and for permission to use the lot
for the storage of building materials and trucks. The peti-
tion was based on the grounds of an alleged non-conform-
ing use of the premises, which had been zoned residential.
The Board found that a non-conforming use had been estab-
lished and approved the application. Appellant failed to
exercise his license within six months from the date it
was issued, and it therefore became null and void.2  Sub-
sequently, in November, 1939, and again in September,
1940, appellant applied for a similar license,3 based on the
non-conforming use which had been found to exist in the
first application. In both of the subsequent hearings, how-
123 A. (2d) 15 (Md., 1941). See, in general, Note, The Doctrine of Res
Adjudicata (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 189.
2Baltimore City Code (1927) Art. 49, Sec. 35.
8This statement is not exactly correct, although for the purposes of its
opinion, the Court of Appeals regarded it as a similar application. The
grounds for petitioner's suit were the same in both applications, i. e., a
non-conforming use. The specific applications made by petitioner were as
follows: In February, 1939, "to construct an addition for tool storage
and to continue to use lot for storage of building materials and trucks at
4403 Alhambra Avenue." The addition was to be 10 ft. x 24 ft. In No-
vember, 1939, petitioner asked "to construct a tool house and garage at
4403 Alhambra Avenue the size to be 72 ft. x 36 ft., 6 inches." In Septem-
ber, 1940, the application was "to construct an addition and to continue
the use of the lot and the garage thereon for the storage of building mate-
rials and trucks." The addition was to be 24 ft. x 12 ft.
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ever, the Board of Zoning Appeals, after reviewing addi-
tional evidence, found that no non-conforming use had
been established, and denied the license. This action was
affirmed by the Baltimore City Court. Appellant con-
tended that the finding of a non-conforming use by the
Board of Zoning Appeals in his application of February,
1939 was res judicata as to whether appellant had a non-
conforming use in the lot in question in his subsequent
applications. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower
court, held that the Board of Zoning Appeals was not a
court or judicial tribunal, and that as a result the doctrine
of res judicata could not apply in this particular case.4
This case suggests the problem of when, if ever, thejudicial doctrine of res judicata will apply to an admin-
istrative board. Because of the numerous ramifications
of the problem,5 discussion in this note will be limited
primarily to the instances when a plea of res judicata,
based on former action in an administrative tribunal vested
with power to grant licenses, will be accepted by the Board
in a subsequent application by the same party for the same
license.
Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium6 and nemo debet
bis vexari pro eadem causa7 are the ancient maxims upon
which the doctrine of res judicata is based. It is primarily
a rule of convenience, giving security to past decisions,
and freezing the future from the threat of similar litiga-
tion.8 The doctrine has many times been defined by the
Court of Appeals in the following language:
"An existing, final judgment or decree rendered
upon its merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
'The Court then affirmed the decree of the lower court in refusing to
grant the license. The grounds on which the decision was based were first,
that the lower court was correct in finding that no non-conforming use
existed under the facts as presented on the record, and secondly, even if
such use did exist, petitioner's request would amount to an expansion of
such use which is prohibited under appropriate ordinances.
sAmong other instances in which the doctrine of res judicara might or
might not apply to administrative tribunals are, first the Board holding
that the same facts had been previously litigated and determined in a law
court; secondly, a law court holding that the issues to be decided have
been previously determined by an Administrative Board; and, thirdly,
where the Board itself possesses in the nature of a "continuing jurisdic-
tion" over the subject matter, and parties present to the tribunal the
same facts for a second determination.
' It is a public concern that there be an end to litigation.
7 No one ought to be twice vexed for the same cause.
'2 F)REEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th Ed. 1925) Sec. 626.
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or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction, on the point and matters in
issue in the first suit."9
The strict judicial doctrine of res judicata has not had
uniform application before administrative boards in gen-
eral.10 There are several reasons, based on sound social
policy, why this should be so. In the first place, admin-
istrative boards are created to secure maximum social ben-
efits without resorting to strict legal procedure. To limit
their power of redetermination 1 by strict legal doctrines
would be to defeat one of the purposes of their creation. 2
Secondly, administrative boards are created to deal with
those aspects of social conditions which are continually
subject to change. Because of these changes, decisions
made in the past might not secure the greatest good to the
greatest number in the future. Past decisions should there-
fore be subject to change, and it is felt that the judicial
doctrine of res judicata should not impede necessary re-
vision. 3 A third reason lies in the fact that administrative
9 Emmert v. Middlekauff, 118 Md. 399, 404, 84 A. 540 (1912) ; Christopher
v. Sisk, 133 Md. 48, 51, 104 A. 355, 356 (1918) ; Baltimore v. Linthicum,
170 Md. 245, 248, 183 A. 531 (1936) ; Knox v.. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 23 A. (2d) 15, 17 (1941).
10 For an article analyzing many of the cases in this field see Schopflocher,
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative La/w (1942) Wisc. L. Rev.
5, 198.
11 Attention is directed to the wording of this clause, since it should be
borne in mind that the instant note deals only with the plea of res judicata
on a redetermination of issues previously settled before the board.
12 Administrative boards are created to extend legislative policy, as well
as to exercise judicial power. In a comparison of such boards with judicial
courts as such, in respect to the procedure used by each, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said:
"Perhaps the most striking characteristic of this movement has
been the investiture of administrative agencies with power far ex-
ceeding and different from the conventional judicial modes for ad-
justing conflicting claims--modes whereby interested litigants define
the scope of the inquiry and determine the data on which the judi-
cial judgment is ultimately based. Administrative agencies have
power themselves to initiate inquiry, or, when their authority Is in-
voked, to control the range of investigation in ascertaining what Is
to satisfy the requirements of the public interest in relation to the
needs of vast regions and sometimes the whole nation in the enjoy-
ment of facilities for transportation, communication, and other
essential public services. These differences in origin and function
preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial
and review which have evolved from the history and experience of
the courts." F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134,
142, 143 (1940).
"8 Attention is called to the various Instances where rates are made by
administrative boards. Patently, as conditions change, rates should change
with them, and the Administrative tribunal should be free to adjust its
ruling in accord with such change. See however Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 284 U. S. 370 (1932).
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boards being peculiarly acquainted with the subject matter
with which they deal, are better qualified to make their
own rules of procedure in a given case than courts of law,
and therefore should not be forced to adopt an already
existing, strict legal doctrine. 4
It by no means follows, however, that the doctrine of
res judicata has, or should have, no application to admin-
,istrative boards. When the board is a licensing board,
as was the situation in the principle case, there are situa-
tions where the doctrine is, and should be, applied. The
classical approach to the problem is to state that if the
licensing board sits in the capacity of a quasi-judicial body,
the doctrine of res judicata should apply, but if it sits as a
quasi-legislative or quasi-executive body, the doctrine
should not apply. 15 The decisions in many cases have
turned on this point," although the difficulty of establish-
ing any clear definition of either term has made this ap-
proach of little real value and has been the cause of great
confusion.'7
The relatively few Maryland cases which have dealt
with this problem do not seem altogether to have followed
the classical approach, but instead seem to have been de-
cided more on the basis of their own individual fact situa-
tions. In Mayor and City Council v. Linthicum,'s the Court
held that the doctrine of res judicata should be applied to
a previous determination by a licensing board. There,
the petitioners twice had sought and been denied a license
from the Board of Zoning Appeals, which denial had been
sustained on appeal to the Baltimore City Court. Subse-
quently to the enactment of procedure vesting the Court
of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction in such cases, peti-
1, For a similar conclusion see Comment, Res Judicata in Administrative
Law (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 1250, 1278.
"5 HART, AN INTRODUCTION To ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1940) 355-356; Com-
ment, Res Judicata in Administrative Law (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 1250, 1253.
10 The doctrine applied since the board acted in its quasi-judicial capacity
in Lilienthal v. Wyandotte, 286 Mich. 604, 282 N. W. 837 (1938) ; Shugg v.
Anacanda Copper Mining Co., 100 Mont. 159, 46 P. (2d) 435 (1935) ; Colusa
County v. tVe Jarnett, 55 Cal. 373 (1880) ; Longinetta v. Shelton, 103 Tenn.
324, 52 S. W. 1078 (1898). But where the board acts in its quasi-legisla-
tive or quasi-judicial capacity, the doctrine will not preclude a redeter-
mination. See People v. McCelallan, 118 App. Div. 177, 103 N. Y. Supp.
146 (1907) ; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 (1908) ; Board of
County Commissioners v. Cypert, 65 Okla. 168, 166 P. 195 (1917) ; Board
of County Commissioners v. Trautman, 204 Ind. 362, 184 N. E. 178 (1933).
17 See for example: Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 6th,
1928). See also Comment, Res Judicata in Tao Litigation (1932) 46 Harv.
L. Rev. 692. Comment, Administrative Tribunals-Operation of Admin-
istrative Orders as Res Judicata (1929) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 677.
"s 170 Md. 245, 183 A. 531 (1936).
1942]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tioner again applied for a similar license on the same
grounds. The application was denied by the Board, but
this was reversed by the Baltimore City Court. The Court
of Appeals, in reversing the lower court, held that the
ordinary rules of res judicata applied, and that as a result
the petitioner was bound by the prior determination of
the Board. The direct holding in Zoning Appeals Board
v. McKinney'9 was that the Board, as such, had no power
to appeal; but the Court stated that even if this were not
true, the Board should not have the power to reopen this
case on the basis of its factual presentation.0 In the prin-
cipal case, the Court allowed the Board to reverse its
former finding of fact, although that same issue had been
decided in favor of the same petitioner in a former hearing.
At first blush, the holding in the principal case seems
inconsistent with other Maryland cases, and with the classi-
cal approach to the problem of res judicata discussed above.
The Maryland cases are easily distinguished, however,
when it is remembered that those cases in which the doc-
trine was applied were cases where the petitioner had
been denied relief in former proceedings, while in the prin-
cipal case, the facts were previously found in his favor.
On the other hand, the result of the Maryland cases, when
compared with a strict application of the classical approach
is inconsistent with the rules there set forth. The reason
lies in the fact that the Board of Zoning Appeals, where
acting within its licensing authority, has been described
as quasi-judicial.2 ' The result would be, therefore, that
the doctrine of res judicata would apply.22
It is submitted, however, that the classical approach
does not necessarily produce the best social result in all
cases. One reason is the practical difficulty in determining
whether a board is acting in its quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative capacity.23  In many cases, administrative
19 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938).
20 After disposing of the appeal, the Court by way of dictum indicated
that the power to reopen should not be hedged about with technicalities,
but upon considering the facts in this particular case, the action of the
board in reopening the determination was void. Ibid, 566.
21 For a description of the Board of Zoning Appeals see Zoning Appeals
Board v. McKenney, Ibid.
2 The Court, by way of dictum, recognized the classical approach in the
McKenney case, Ibid. The Court quoted the following language from 43
C. J. 356: "When the board of appeals is considered a quasi-judicial
tribunal, the general rule is that such board is not vested with the power
to reopen and rehear a proceeding which has once been terminated, at least
in the absence of mistake in the prior proceedings."
2" For a similar criticism see Comment, Operation of Aaministrative
Orders as Re8 Judicata (1929) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 677.
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boards can act either ministerially or judicially. If the
rule is to be strictly followed, the result in any given case
will turn upon the Court's definition of terms rather than
on the social ends to be realized. Another objection to the
classical approach lies in the fact that the doctrine of res
judicata, when applied to administrative tribunals in gen-
eral, has not been the subject of any strict legal formula
and therefore should not necessarily be so relegated merely
because the board is a licensing tribunal.24
However, without attempting labelling, certain general
situations might be said normally to call for an application
of res judicata. Where the past rights of an individual
have been determined and vested by virtue of administra-
tive adjudication, the doctrine of res judicata should apply
for his protection. 5 Where the petitioner after a full and
fair hearing has been denied a license, the doctrine of res
judicata should protect the public from continued litigation
on the same factual basis. 6 Moreover, in the majority
of cases, if the petitioner has presented in good faith all
the available facts, secured a license by virtue of admin-
istrative adjudication, and changed his position in reliance
thereon, the doctrine of res judicata should protect him
from a redetermination of the issues by the board." Even
in such cases, however, it has been urged that if the public
would suffer as the result of the license having been
granted, the administrative board should have the power
to reopen the facts, notwithstanding the change in position
made by the petitioner,2 and that in such event the doc-
trine of res judicata should have no applicability. 29
With the exception of the illustrations analysed above,
it is submitted that the strict legal doctrine of res judicata
should not generally apply to a licensing administrative
board. Clarity is not aided by making decisions turn on
21 See Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law
(1942) Wise. L. Rev. 5, 198.
25 See Comment, Res Judicata in Administrative Law (1941) 29 George-
town L. J. 878, 881; HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1940)
367; Brougham v. Blanton Manufacturing Co., 243 Fed. 503.
2 HART, supra, n. 24; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Linthicum,
170 Md. 245, 183 A. 531 (1936) ; Zoning Appeals v. McKenney, 174 Md. 551,
199 A. 540 (1938); In re Barratt's Appeal, 14 App. D. C. 225 (1899);
Cardinal Bus Lines v. Consolidated Coach Corporation, 254 Ky. 586, 72
S. W. (2d) 7 (1934) ; People v. Leon, 120 Misc. 355, 193 N. Y. Supp. 391
(1923) ; Little v. Board of Adjustment, 195 N. C. 793, 143 S. E. 827 (1928).
21 See United States, ex rel. Straskey, v. Reimer, 101 F. (2d) 267 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1939).
28 Such an approach to the problem was indicated in F. C. 0. v. Potts-
ville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134 (1940).
2 "This view is criticized in Comment, Res Judicata in Administrative
Law (1940) Yale L. J. 1250, 1267.
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whether the board is sitting in quasi-judicial or quasi-legis-
lative capacity. Rather, each case should be decided on
the basis of the facts that it presents with an eye to the
policy behind the doctrine of res judicata and the purpose
of the administrative action involved. Such seems to be
the approach of the Maryland cases in general and the
instant case in particular.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONFLICT OF LAWS
Coastwise Petroleum Company v. Standard Oil
Company of N. J.'
Defendant inquired of plaintiff as to a prospective pur-
chase of a large quantity of benzol. Plaintiff replied by
letter, offering to sell the desired quantity to defendant on
named terms. Defendant, by telephone, said it was ac-
cepting the offer, but added other terms (thus it is ques-
tionable whether there was actually anything more than a
counter-offer, although the opinion appears to assume an
outright acceptance by defendant). Defendant then with-
drew, notifying plaintiff, again by telephone. All this
occurred in New York. Plaintiff sold the benzol at 14¢ per
gallon instead of the 20¢ provided for in the alleged con-
tract, and sued defendant in Maryland (in the Superior
Court of Baltimore City) for the difference, which ex-
ceeded $30,000. Defendant demurred to plaintiff's evidence
on the basis of the Statute of Frauds,2 and the demurrer
prayer was granted. Plaintiff appealed, contending that
estoppel is a recognized exception to the Statute of Frauds,
and that defendant was estopped to set up the Statute as a
defense here. Held: Affirmed.
The Court of Appeals went into a rather elaborate dis-
cussion of the Maryland authorities to show that in Mary-
land estoppel is not an exception to the operation of the
Statute. Then, seemingly as an afterthought, the Court,
in the last paragraph of the opinion, said: "The negotia-
tions were all in New York, and the law of that state
would apply. The Statute there is substantially the same
as it is in this state, and we have not been shown, nor do
119 A. (2d) 180 (Md., 1941).
29 Charles II, Ch. 3; 2 ALEXANDER, BRITisH STATUTES IN FORCE IN
MARYLAND (Coe's Ed. 1912) 789. Sec. 17 of the Statute was re-enacted in
effect by Sec. 22 of the Uniform Sales Act of 1910, Ch. 346, Sec. 273; Md.
Code (1939) Art. 83, Sec. 22. The language of the re-enactment is "shall
not be enforceable by action".
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